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THIS quantitative analysis of ·the decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court includes the cases beginning with Bickell v. Flint 
. Civil Service Comm'n/ decided June 3,1963, and ending with Osgerby 
v. Tuscola Circuit Judge,2 decided June 1, 1964. In form it is some-
what similar to that published each year by the Harvard Law Review 
with respect to the work of the United States Supreme Court,3 subject, 
of course, to the differences between the procedures of the two courts. 
Lest some readers should seek qualitative conclusions from the 
data presented here, a caveat is offered: No firm conclusions about 
the quality of any justice's work-the amount of time spent, the 
depth of research, the philosophical or jurisprudential bases for agree-
ment or disagreement with other justices, the influence of his politics, 
his devotion to his work, his judicial temperament or his ability-can 
be derived from a study which is and purports to be nothing more 
than a numerical tabulation. At best these statistics are suggestive; 
at worst they may be deceiving. Anyone wishing to develop meaning-
ful conclusions about the qualitative aspects of a justice's work, there-
fore, is enjoined to read the decisions carefully and to consider also 
the other burdensome but necessary tasks, such as creating and 
amending court rules, which the justices are often called upon to 
perform. 
DISPOSITION OF REpORTED CASES 
Table I reveals that the ratio of affirmances to reversals of appel-
late docket cases was exactly two to one during the Survey period 
(138 to .69). Of a total of 216 cases on the appellate docket 138, or 
64 per cent, were affirmed, and 69, or 32 per cent, were reversed. On 
the original docket, however, the ratio of writs granted to writs 
denied was three to two (6 to 4). If the granting of an original writ 
is equated with a reversal, and the denial with an affirmance, the per-
centage of affirmances drops slightly (to 62 per cent) and the per-
centage of reversals increases slightly (to 34 per cent). 
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University; Member of the Michigan and Massa-
chusetts Bars. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of William E. Boyd, 
of the Law Review editorial staff, who helped to collect and collate the statistics for 
this article. 
1. 370 Mich. 316, 121 N.W.2d 852 (1963). 
2. 373 Mich. 237, 128 N.W.2d 351 (1964). 
3. See The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 179 (1964). 
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TABLE I 
DISPOSITION OF REpORTED CASES 
Aff'd in part Appeal Writ Writ 
Total Affirmed Reversed Rev'd in part Modified Remanded dismissed granted denied Other 
Original Docket 
(No per curiams) 121 6 41 22 
Appellate Docket 
Full Opinion 2021 1288 664 55 1 1 1 
Per Curiam 14 10 3 1 
Other 
Per Curiam 16 16 
Totals 229 138 69 5 2 1 1 6 4 3 
1 Wilson v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 370 Mich. 404, 122 N.W.2d 57 (1963) is an original mandamus action and an appeal in 
the nature of mandamus. For the purposes of this table it is included only under "Appellate Docket," and does not appear in the 
total of "Original Docket" cases. The writ was denied. 
2 For the purposes of this table In re Apportionment of State Legislature, 372 Miell. 418-482, 126 N.W.2d 731, 127 N.W.2d 862, 
128 N.W.2d 350 (1964) is treated as two cases. 
8 In Petoskey Chamber of Commerce v. City of Petoskey, 372 Mich. 483, 127 N.W.2d 363 (1964) the court refused to affirm or 
disaffirm part of the decree "for want of clarity of facts." In McCarty v. Mercury Metal Co., 372 Mich. 567, 127 N.W.2d 340 (1964) 
the judgment was affirmed but the case was remanded for a determination as to whether defendant sustained its burden of proof, 
pursuant to GCR 1963, 810. 
4 Where the practical effect of a remand or modification was to reverse the decision of the court below, the case is treated here 
as a reversal. See, e.g., Callihan v. Talkowski, 372 Mich. 1, 124 N.W.2d 788 (1963) and Cooke v. Taube, 372 Mich. 132, 125 N.W.2d 
278 (1963). The headnote in the advance sheet reporting People v. Lyall, 372 Mich. 607, 127 N.W.2d 345 (1964), which indicates that 
the case was affirmed, is incorrect. 
1\ In Winchester v. Meads, 372 Mich. 593, 127 N.W.2d 337 (1964) the court reversed and remanded for a new trial limited to 
damages only. 
6 In re Districting for Court of Appeals, 372 Mich. 227, 125 N.W.2d 719 (1964) is a letter from the Justices to the Governor, 
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Once the new court of appeals begins to function it can be 
expected that a higher percentage of reversals will occur. This will 
result from the fact that the supreme court will then hear appeals 
only on leave granted and will undoubtedly weed out those cases in 
which the appeal is on its face without merit but which might have 
been appealed of right during the Survey period.4 
DISPOSITION OF CRmrnAL CASES AND NEGLIGENCE CASES 
Cases classified as criminal cases and negligence cases under 
Table II accounted for 34 per cent of all the cases decided by the 
court during the Survey period. Of 19 decisions in the "criminal" 
category 10, or 53 per cent, favored the government, and 9, or 47 
per cent, favored the defendant (or prisoner). Of 54 negligence cases 
(excluding the "other" category) the claimant prevailed in 31 (57 
per cent) and the defendant in 23 (43 per cent). 
It is interesting to note that while affirmances in all cases gener-
ally outnumbered reversals by two to one, this ratio does not neces-
sarily apply to particular types of litigants in either the "criminal" 
or "negligence" categories. Thus, defendants in negligence cases seek-
ing reversal of judgments against ,them succeeded in only 3 out of 17 
instances, while claimants seeking reversal succeeded in 17 out of 37 
instances. Similarly, defendants appealing in criminal cases won re-
versal in 6 of 13 appeals. 
Table II also indicates that claimants in negligence cases involv-
ing automobiles fared slightly better on appeal than claimants in 
other negligence cases. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT DECISIONS 
In this first statistical survey the affirmance-reversal record of 
lower court judges carries little significance. A hasty perusal of Table 
III will reveal that relatively few decisions of each judge reached the 
supreme court during the Survey year. It is certainly not fair, there-
fore, to predicate an appraisal of any judge's success in conducting 
trials without reversible error upon these scanty statistics. Hopefully, 
however, cumulative totals in future years will be more meaningful. 
Nonetheless, the very fact that not more than eight decisions of 
anyone judge reached the supreme court during the Survey year is 
of some importance, if only to indicate that the vast bulk of cases 
do not reach the appellate level. Of particular interest is the fact that 
4. See Honigman, Appellate Practice-1965, 43 Mich. St. B.J. 11 (Nov. 1964) and 
Stockmeyer, Michigan's New Court of Appeals: An Introduction, 43 Mich. St. B.J. 49 
(Aug. 1964). 
TABLE II 
DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL CASES AND NEGLIGENCE CASES 
Affirmances for Reversals for 
government defendant Other Total 
Criminal Cases 
General 6 6 12 
Habeas Corpus 51 6 
Other 12 
Totals 7 6 6 19 
Affirmances for Affirmances for Reversals for Reversals for 
claimant defendant claimant defendant Other Total 
Negligence Cases8 
Involving Motor Vehicles 6 10 9 25 
Other 8 10 8 3 44 33 
Totals 14 20 17 3 4 58 
1 These cases are treated as original writs rather than appeals. In three cases the writ was granted, in two cases it was denied. 
2 In People v. Holnagel, 371 Mich. 347, 123 N.W.2d 726 (1963) the supreme court affirmed the denial of a petition praying that 
petitioner be declared a criminal sexual psychopathic person. 
S Included in this category are all actions based on a negligence theory. However, appeals raising only jurisdictional questions 
or questions involving only the liability of an insurance company on its indemnity policy were omitted. See, e.g., Jakubowski v. Goebel 
Brewing Co., 371 Mich. 383, 124 N'w.2d 241 (1963) and Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Zeller, 370 Mich. 496, 122 N.W.2d 728 (1963). 
Specifically included are cases based on the "Dramshop Act" and malpractice cases. Cases involving collisions between automobiles and 
trains were treated as cases involving motor vehicles. However, one case involving an injury to a passenger already on board a bus 
was treated in the "other" category. See Getz v. City of Detroit, 372 Mich. 98, 125 N.W.2d 275 (1963). 
4 One decision was vacated and remanded for compliance with the court rules. Owens v. City of Detroit, 371 Mich. 569, 124 
N.W.2d 873 (1963). In Otto Taylor Constr. Co. v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 372 Mich. 376, 126 N.W.2d 701 (1964) a writ of manda-
mus to vacate an order for discovery was denied. Winchester v. Meads, 372 Mich. 593, 127 N.W.2d 337 (1964) resulted in a partial 
new trial as to damages only. Lastly, in Peasley v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 373 Mich. 222, 128 N.W.2d 515 (1964) the court refused 








1964] WORK OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT 
TABLEm 
DISl'OSlTION OF LOWER COURT DECISIONSI 
(By Individual Judge) 
Aff'd in part 
and rev'd Re- Appeal 
5 
Judge and Court2 Affirmed Reversed in part Modified manded dismissed Total 
Adams, C. J. 
6th Circuit 
Oakland 








Baker, J. W. 
7th Circuit 
Genesee 






Baum, V. J. 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
Beer, W. J. 
6th Circuit 
Oakland 
Beers, H. L. 
14th Circuit 
Muskegon 

















4 1 5 
2 
1 2 
1 Fifteen cases handed down during the Survey period were excluded because they 
did not involve direct review of the decision of a lower court judge. One case, Harrison 
v. Ford Motor Co., 370 Mich. 683, 122 N.W.2d 680 (1963) is reported twice because it 
treats two appeals, one from Judge Baum and one from Judge Montante, which were 
consolidated in the supreme court. 
Among the decisions excluded were five petitions for writ of habeas corpus, three 
appeals from the workmen's compensation appeal board, one petition for mandamus to 
the Pharmacy Board, two appeals from en bane decisions of the 7th Circuit, one letter 
to the Legislature, one appeal from the corporation tax appeal board and the reappor-
tionment decisions. 
2 Only the home circuits and counties of the judges are listed. These are not neces-
sarily the circuits in which the cases were heard. 
6 WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11 
TABLE m (Continued) 
Aff'd in part 
and rev'd Re- Appeal 
Judge and Court2 Affirmed Reversed in part Modified manded dismissed Total 
Bowles, G. E. 6 6 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
Borchard, F. J. 4 4 
10th Circuit 
Saginaw 
Breakey, J. R., Jr. 2 2 4 
22nd Circuit 
Washtenaw 










Canham, J. N. 1 1 2 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 




Carroll, H. R. 3 3 
16th Circuit 
Macomb 




Coash, L. E. 1 2 3 
30th Circuit 
Ingham 
Culehan, M. N. 1 23 3 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
3 In Ordon v. Sarko, 371 Mich. 689, 124 N.W.2d 876 (1963) four justices who 
originally had opposed reversal changed their votes when an application for rehearing 
was brought before them. 
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TABLE m (Continued) 
Aff'd in part 
and rev'd Re- Appeal 
Judge and Court2 Affirmed Reversed in part Modified manded dismissed Total 
Dalton, J. C. 2 17 3 
4th Circuit 
Jackson 
Deneweth, G. R., Jr. 24 1 3 
16th Circuit 
Macomb 
Dondero, S. G. 5 3 8 
6th Circuit 
Oakland 





Fitzgerald, N. 4 4 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
Fox, R. W. 3 1 4 
9th Circuit 
Kalamazoo 
Gillis, J. A. 1 1 
Detroit Recorder's 
Court 
Gilmore, R. W. 3 3 1 7 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 





Roflius, S. 1 1 2 
17th Circuit 
Kent 
4 In Millett v. Millett, 372 Mich. 259, 125 N.W.2d 856 (1964) a decree denying 
divorce was affirmed but the appeal relating to costs was dismissed as not appealable 
of right. The decision in McCarty v. Mercury Metal Co., 372 Mich. 567, 127 N.W.2d 340 
(1964) was affirmed in part and remanded for supplemental opinion. 
G Callihan v. Talowski, 372 Mich. 1, 124 N.W.2d 788 (1963) was in form a remand 
but in substance a reversal. 
6 The supreme court refused to affirm or disaffirm part of the decree for ''want of 
clarity of facts." Petoskey Chamber of Co=erce v. City of Petoskey, 372 Mich. 483, 
127 N.W.2d 363 (1964). 
7 New trial on the question of damages only. Winchester v. Meads, 372 Mich. 593, 
127 N.W.2d 337 (1964). 
8 WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11 
TABLE ITI (Continued) 
Aff'd in part 
and rev'd Re- Appeal 
Judge and Court2 Affirmed Reversed in part Modified manded dismissed Total 





Holland, H. R. 2 3 1 6 
{)th Circuit 
Oakland 
Huff, E. S. 3 3 
10th Circuit 
Saginaw 
Hughes, S. S. 1 
30th Circuit 
Ingham 
Kane, E. T. 3 2 5 
31st Circuit 
St. Clair 
Kaufman, N. J. 2 1 3 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
Koscinski, A. J. 1 
Detroit Recorder's 
Court 
McCree, W. H. 1 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
McGregor, L. D. 2 2 4 
7th Circuit 
Genesee 





Montante, J. 1 2 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
Moynihan, J. A., Jr. 2 2 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
Murphy, T. J. 3 2 5 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
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TABLE m (Continuedr 
Aff'din part 
and rev'd Re- Appeal 
Judge and Court2 Affirmed Reversed in part Modified manded dismissed Total 
Noe, A. H. 3 2 5 
16th Circuit 
Macomb 
O'Neill, J. E. 3 3 
10th Circuit 
Saginaw 
Parker, D. D. 4 1 5 
7th Circuit 
Genesee 
Piggins, E. S. 4 4 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 










Ricca, J. A. 2 2 
Detroit Recorder's 
Court 
Roth, S. J. 1 2 3· 
7th Circuit 
Genesee 




Salmon, M. J. 2 1 3 
30th Circuit 
Ingham 
Searl, F. N. 1 1 2 
17th Circuit 
Kent 
Smith, R. G. 3 1 4 
18th Circuit 
Bay 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Aff'd in part 
and rev'd Re- Appeal 
Judge and Court2 Affirmed Reversed in part Modified manded dismissed Total 




Spier, J. E. 2 3 
16th Circuit 
Macomb 






Streeter, H. I. 2 2 
31st Circuit 
St. Clair 
Sullivan, J. A. 1 2 1 4 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
Sweet, L. F. 2 2 
9th Circuit 
Kalamazoo 
Vander Ploeg, C. 2 2 
Superior Court of 
Grand Rapids 
VanderWal, J. H. 1 1 2 
17th Circuit 
Kent 





Weideman, C. M. 1 2 3 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
Weipert, W. J., Jr. 1 1 
38th Circuit 
Monroe 
Wise, J. M. 4 2 6 
3rd Circuit 
Wayne 
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TABLE m (Continued) 
Aff'd in part 
and rev'd Re- Appeal 
Judge and Court2 Affirmed Reversed in part Modified manded dismissed Total 
Zick, K. F. 
2nd Circuit 
Berrien 





8 In form a modification but in substance a reversal. Cooke v. Taube, 372 Mich. 
132, 125 N.W.2d 278 (1963). 
only four direct appeals from the Recorder's Court of the City of 
Detroit are reported. That court handles a sizeable volume of criminal 
cases; in 1962 alone 1,029 felonies and 7,354 misdemeanors were 
disposed of by tria1.5 That only four cases from Recorder's Court 
received plenary review during the Survey year is a startling reve-
lation which merits further inquiry. 
Hopefully, the existence of the new court of appeals, rules per-
mitting appeals of right in criminal cases6 and recent decisions, requir-
ing the appointment of counsel and the furnishing of transcripts in 
criminal cases7 will result in a substantial increase in the percentage 
of criminal cases which become subject to appellate scrutiny. 
OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES 
Part A.-Of 229 reported decisions (including one letter to the 
Legislature) 167, or 73 per cent, were unanimous with only one written 
opinion; 23, or 10 per cent, were unanimous with more than one 
written opinion; and 30, or 13 per cent, contained dissenting opinions 
(five with more than one). Only 9, or 4 per cent, of the decisions were 
affirmed by equal division. The breakdown of opinions in these last 
decisions is not reported, although of course they all contained at 
least one opinion for affirmance and one supporting a different 
disposition. 
Part B.-This table is a breakdown of the opinions written by 
the individual justices. Justice Adams participated in only 42 decisions 
because he was seated late in the Survey period; Chief Justice Carr 
5. See Supreme Court of Michigan, Office of the Court Administrator, Annual 
Report and Judicial Statistics for 1962, Table IV, p. 86 (1963). 
6. See note 4, supra. 
7. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 
(1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
353 (1963). 
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TABLE IV 
OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES 
Part A 
[Vol. 11 
Total Reported Decisions 2291 
Unanimous one opinion decisions2 
(including per curiams), 167 (includes 11 per curiams) 
Unanimous Decisions (more than one opinion) 23 
Decisions with Dissents (total) 30 
With one dissenting opinion 25 
With more than one dissenting opinion 5 
Decisions by equal division 9 
1 In re Apportionment of Legislature, 372 Mich. 418-482, 126 N.W.2d 731, 127 N.W.2d 
862, 128 N.W.2d 350 (1964) was here treated as two decisions. 
2 Includes decisions in which one or more of the justices "concurred in result." 
This is not true, however, of the category "Unanimous Opinions" in Part B of this table, 
infra. 
participated in only 134 decisions because he retired from the bench 
during the period. Justice Kavanagh replaced Carr as chief justice. 
It is apparent that of the justices who participated throughout 
the Survey period Black and Souris wrote the most opinions. Together 
they accounted for more than one-third of all the opinions written, 
including more than one-half of the dissenting opinions. Justice Souris, 
with 19 unanimous opinions and 11 controlling majority opinions, 
seemed to have the greatest success in convincing his colleagues to 
support his views, at least in terms of numbers of cases. 
Part C.-The total number of occasions in which each justice 
has "concurred in result" is reported separately because it represents 
a somewhat disturbing situation to those who seek to understand the 
court's decisions. When a justice concurs in result only, but does not 
bother to explain why he does not also concur in the opinions of other 
justices who favor the same result, he leaves several possibilities open. 
Perhaps he disagrees with the reasoning of the other justices, believing 
it to be faulty. If so, he would seem to have an obligation, possibly 
constitutional in nature,S to set forth the correct reasoning as he sees 
it. If his objection is to the scope or breadth of the decision or of some 
dictum in the opinion, his reasons might become very useful in restrict-
ing or broadening the effect of his brethren's opinions in future cases. 
Certainly the benefit of his different reasoning might prove helpful 
to other appellate courts considering a similar problem, or possibly 
to a reconstituted Michigan Supreme Court reconsidering the same 
problem at some future date. 
Perhaps he is too busy with other opinions to waste his time 
8. Cf. Mich. Const. art. VI, § 6 (1963). 
TABLE IV 




Concurring opinions not 
decisions Controlling 
joined by majority Dissenting opinionsG 
participated Unanimous majority Full Signed Full Signed Total 
in opinionsl opinions2 opinionsS memos4 opinions memos opinions 
Adams, Paul L. 42 6 3 2 1 0 0 12 
Black, Eugene F. 222 16 10 16 1 14 0 57 
Carr, Leland W. 134 11 5 6 1 2 0 25 
Dethmers, John R. 225 16 6 S6 0 47 1 35 
Kavanagh, Thomas M. 229 13 2 2 0 2 1 20 
.Kelly, Harry F. 227 15 7 7 0 4 0 33 
O'Hara, Michael D. 214 14 2 10 0 6 0 32 
Smith, Otis M. 225 17 11 6 2 2 0 38 
Souris, Theodore 224 19 11 11 1 14 0 56 
TOTALS 127 57 68 6 48 2 308 
1 Refers to opmlOns in which all the justices participating in the case joined. Excluded are opinions which would be unanimous 
but for the fact that one or more justices merely "concurred in result." 
2 Refers to opinions in which more than half of the justices then sitting joined. Included are the opinions, mentioned above in 
note 1, which would be unanimous but for the fact that one or more justices "concurred in result." 
S Refers to concurring opinions in which not more than one-half of the justices then sitting joined. Such opinions are included 
in this category whether they are controlling or not. For example, when the court divides four to four the decision below will be 
affirmed. If four of the justices have joined in one opinion for affirmance it will be reported in this category rather than as a "con-
. trolling majority opinion." (In fact, of course, such a decision should not have precedential effect in future cases.) 
"Full opinions" are those which contain more than one short paragraph. 
4 Same as note 3, above, except that the opinion consists of only one short paragraph. The opinion mayor may not contain 
citations. 
G Where a decision is affirmed by equal division, opinions calling for reversal or disposition other than affirmance are included 
as dissenting opinions. The difference between "full opinions" and "signed memos" is the same as that set forth above in notes 3 and 4. 
6 Included here is Justice Dethmers' opinion in Potter v. Potter, 372 Mich. 637, 127 N.W.2d 320 (1964) in which he resubmitted 
Chief Justice Carr's earlier opinion for consideration by the court. 
7 Included here is Justice Dethmers' dissent in People v. Lyall, 372 Mich. 607, 127 N.W.2d 345 (1964), in which he adopted Chief 
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TABLE IV 
OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES 
Part C 











1 Includes all cases in which a justice has concurred only in result and has not 
written an opinion setting forth the reasoning in support of his concurrence nor ex-
plained why he has not joined in another justice's opinion in support of the result. 
2 Includes one case, People v. Walker, 371 Mich. 599, 124 N.W.2d 761 (1963), in 
which a conviction was affirmed by an equally divided court and in which Justice Black 
"concurred in result" with an opinion joined by the three other justices voting for 
reversal. In practical effect, therefore, Justice Black's concurrence in result should be 
deemed a "concurrence in dissent." 
reporting a minor disagreement. Perhaps he agrees with the reasoning 
of his colleagues but dislikes the language they used to express it. 
Or he thinks the opinion may be an unpopular one and does not wish 
to be recorded as joining it. Perhaps he has not had an opportunity 
to examine the briefs and records carefully or to research the problem, 
but concurs in result simply because he feels, instinctively, that the 
outcome is correct. No one, of course, is entitled to draw any of these 
conclusions from a concurrence in result, and there is no intention 
to do so here. The point is, however, that anyone is entitled to con-
clude that a justice had some reason for not joining his colleague's 
opinion. Such a concurrence provides no guidance and, unfortunately, 
casts a shadow on the authoritativeness of the signed opinion while 
leaving open a question about the motives of the concurring justice. 
A written opinion, even a brief one, setting forth a justice's reasons 
for concurring separately would eliminate these difficulties. 
Hopefully, the existence of an intermediate court of appeals 
which can finally dispose of unimportant appeals will provide the 
opportunity for the elimination of the "concurrence in result" practice 
in the supreme court. 
Part D.-This part reports the alignment of the justices, one 
with the other.9 Of the justices who participated throughout the entire 
9. Compare Table III, Action of Individual Justices, The Supreme Court, 1963 
Term, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 182 (1964). Each United States Supreme Court Justice wrote an 
TABLE IV 
OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES 
Part D 
Agreement and disagreement1 
Souris Smith O'Hara Kelly Kavanagh Dethmers Carr Black 
0 34 35 34 32 35 33 30 
SC 1 1 1 1 1 
SD 
Adams 
AR 4 4 7 6 4 5 4 
AD 
TO 34 36 34 33 36 34 31 
TA 38 40 41 39 40 39 35 
N 39 40 41 41 41 41 37 
0 157 155 149 151 160 149 86 
SC 12 6 1 1 12 1 
SD 10 4 1 2 11 2 
Black 
AR 24 36 31 39 29 39 26 
AD 5 4 
TO 179 165 151 154 183 152 86 . 
TA 208 201 182 "193 216 191 112 
N 216 217 206 220 221 218 132 
0 96 106 92 107 93 103 
SC 1 10 13 14 
SD 1 2 7 1 7 
Carr 
AR 15 12 8 6 23 6 
AD 1 
TO 96 108 104 127 94 124 
TA 111 120 113 133 117 130 
N 133 133 120 134 134 131 
0 161 168 161 174 160 
SC 2 16 20 
SD 6 14 
Dethmers 
AR 25 27 16 15 34 
AD 1 
TO 161 170 183 208 160 
TA 186 197 200 223 194 
N 220 221 210 224 225 
0 178 173 161 163 
SC 11 6 2 1 
SD 10 7 
Kavanagh 
AR 16 27 25 33 
AD . 2 
TO 199 186 163 164 
TA 217 213 188 197 
N 223 224 213 227 
0 164 174 168 
SC 1 2 17 
SD 4 
Kelly AR 24 24 12 
AD 2 
TO 165 176 189 
TA 189 200 203 
N 222 223 212 
0 159 169 
O'Hara 
Smith 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Agreement and disagreementl 






















1 This table represents the alignment of the justices with one another. The key to the 
symbols is as follows; 
O-represents the number of times the justices joined in the same majority opinion. 
SC-represents the number of times the justices joined in the same concurring 
opinion, i.e., in an opinion which agreed with the result of the decision but 
which was not joined in by a majority of the justices then sitting. 
SD-represents the number of times the justices joined in the same dissenting opinion. 
AR-represents the number of times the justices agreed with the result of the decision 
but did 'not join in the same opinion. Among the situations in this category 
are those in which the two justices both "concurred in result." 
AD-represents the number of times the justices agreed in dissent but did not join 
the same dissenting opinion. 
TO-represents the total number of times the justices joined in the same opinion, i.e., 
the total of 0, SC and SD. 
TA-represents the total number of times the justices agreed with each other as to 
the desired result, whether or not they joined in the same opinion, i.e., the total 
of 0, SC, SD, AR and AD. 
N-The total number of decisions in which the justices participated. Except for one 
case this figure indicates the number of opportunities for agreement. In Wilson 
v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 370 Mich. 404, 122 N.W.2d 57 (1963) Justice Souris 
wrote the court's opinion which was joined in by Dethmers, Kelly, Black, 
Kavanagh and Smith. In addition, Justice Black wrote another opinion which 
was also joined in by a majority of the justices, including Carr, Kavanagh, 
Souris and Smith. Thus, for the justices who participated, this one case created 
two opportunities to join in a majority opinion. 
Other possible distortions are presented by the following; In Ordon v. Sarko, 371 
Mich. 689, 124 N.W.2d 896 (1963) the justices were equally divided in the original deci-
sion. On application for rehearing, however, four justices originally voting for dismissal 
decided to join the other four for reversal. The justices who joined the same opinion are 
reported under "SC"; the justices who did not join the same opinion are reported under 
"AR". In Brown v. Forrester Constr. Co., 372 Mich. 204, 125 N.W.2d 315 (1963) Justices 
Black, Kavanagh and Souris are reported as joined in the same dissenting opinion but 
their dissent was only as to costs. In re Districting for Court of Appeals, 372 Mich. 227, 
125 N.W.2d 719 (1964) is reported as a majority opinion in which all the justices then 
sitting concurred, even though it was not a "case" in the usual sense. Mr. Justice Carr did 
not participate. Lastly, for the purposes of this part of Table IV the reapportionment 
decision, In re Apportionment of Legislature, 372 Mich. 418-482, 126 N.W.2d 731, 127 
N.W.2d 862, 128 N.W.2d 350 (1964), is treated as only one decision in which the align-
ment of the justices is reported only with respect to the final result, the adoption of the 
"Hanna" plan, and not with respect to their views on delaying decision. 
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survey period, Dethmers and Kelly joined with each other in the 
greatest number of opinions (208 out of 224) and also agreed most 
frequently as to the desired result (223 out of 224). 
If the justices are often unwilling to join with all the others in 
the same opinion, they do not usually disagree about the desired 
result. In this regard the greatest number of disagreements was regis-
tered between Justices Dethmers and Souris, and they only disagreed 
in 34 of 220 cases (15 per cent). 
average of about 31 opinions during the 1963 Term;' each Michigan Supreme Court 
Justice who participated throughout the entire Survey year wrote an average of about 
37 opinions. 
